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In June 2011, Apple Inc. stopped purchasing minerals for its 
electronics from the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (the “D.R. Congo”). Apple did so following the proposal of 
new federal legislation requiring companies to disclose “conflict 
minerals” used to manufacture their products. “Conflict minerals” 
include tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold (also commonly referred to 
as the “3 Ts and gold”), derived from the D.R. Congo and adjoining 
countries.1 The federal legislation was part of a humanitarian-activist 
agenda to dissuade corporations from purchasing minerals that 
subsidize armed groups—who control parts of the mining processes—
and halt human rights violations resulting from those groups’ 
activities. 
The D.R. Congo has a diverse set of humanitarian problems, and 
depending on whom you ask, there are various factors to blame: lack 
of infrastructure, poor medical care, and regional violence. In the past 
twenty years, the D.R. Congo has experienced two destructive wars 
involving six neighboring countries that resulted in overthrows of 
successive governments and human rights atrocities. Despite 
subsiding international tensions, armed groups are still thriving within 
the country, mostly due to the weak government’s inability to curb the 
fighting. One way the armed groups pay their troops’ salaries and 
feed their families is through the abundant and profitable mineral 
trade. 
Up until ten years ago, the conflict mineral trade in the D.R. Congo 
had not received much attention from the United States despite many 
U.S. companies’ reliance on Congolese mineral production for 
various types of consumer product manufacturing. Previously, activist 
groups had tried to garner Western support by pointing to the D.R. 
Congo’s need for international aid and assistance to rebuild a war-torn 
nation, but their cause was largely ignored. In a new effort to 
engender international support for the humanitarian crisis and bring 
attention to the ongoing fighting, activist groups began a campaign 
 
1 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274 (Aug. 22, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 240 & 249b). 
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linking mineral production profits with funding for violent conflicts—
a self-acknowledged adaptation of the Liberia-blood diamond 
awareness campaign that garnered widespread Western attention and 
support. 
In 2010, as the U.S. Congress was enacting the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) to 
promote financial stability, activist groups successfully lobbied to 
include Section 1502. Section 1502 required the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to implement disclosure rules for 
companies that use conflict minerals in their products.2 Congress’s 
explicit intent was to stop U.S.-listed companies from subsidizing 
armed groups responsible for conflict in the D.R. Congo by shaming 
them into adopting more socially responsible mineral sourcing 
practices. Disclosure laws work by exposing a public company’s 
activities, which consequently informs shareholders and allows them 
to voice their humanitarian concerns to influence the company’s, 
otherwise profit-motivated, operations. 
Even before the SEC regulations were finalized, companies such as 
Apple stopped indiscriminately purchasing from smelters whose 
minerals originated in the D.R. Congo. Instead Apple turned to the 
Conflict Free Smelter program (CFS), which identifies smelters 
whose raw materials do not originate from sources that fund conflict 
in the D.R. Congo.3 While CFS compliant smelters accept minerals 
from conflict-free areas in the D.R. Congo (primarily western areas 
because the conflict zones are concentrated in the eastern Congo), 
Section 1502 has led to a de facto ban by U.S.-listed companies on 
sources of tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold originating from the 
eastern D.R. Congo.4 Sourcing smelters no longer buy minerals from 
affected regions, particularly the eastern D.R. Congo.5 The impact of 
this de facto ban has been catastrophic for the nation’s mining 
industry, even for those mining sources located away from the eastern 
 
2 U.S. SEC. AND EXCH COMM’N, SPECIALIZED CORP. DISCLOSURE, http://www.sec.gov 
/spotlight/dodd-frank/speccorpdisclosure.shtml (2013). 
3 APPLE, SUPPLIER RESPONSIBILITY, http://www.apple.com/supplierresponsibility 
/labor-and-human-rights.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2013). 
4 Laura E. Seay, What’s Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502? Conflict Minerals, Civilian 
Livelihoods, and the Unintended Consequences of Western Advocacy, 14 (Ctr. for Global 
Dev., Working Paper No. 284, 2012). 
5 Id. 
130 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 16, 127 
 
Congo conflicts.6 Tens of thousands of lawful miners and millions of 
people that depend on artisanal mining in the DRC have seen their 
primary livelihood and source of sustenance disappear.7 
Congress’s goal when implementing Section 1502 was to 
encourage socially responsible corporate behavior and, in turn, 
remedy the D.R Congo’s humanitarian crisis. One problem with this 
type of legislation is that social responsibility is an abstract concept. 
In Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic 
Globalization, Professor Cynthia Williams posits that (from among 
many choices) the predominant legal consensus is appropriate for 
examining corporate social responsibility.8 This consensus is 
premised on two assumptions: first, that a corporation’s main purpose 
is to maximize shareholder value, and, second, the constraints of U.S. 
law are sufficient to address any concerns about the exercise of 
corporate power and to ensure that companies fully internalize all of 
the social and environmental costs of their business.9 In the 
transnational environment, however, Professor Williams identifies 
issues with the constraint assumption in the predominant legal 
consensus: What law should the company follow? Who sets the 
regulations? What types of regulations can and/or should be imposed? 
Professor Williams concludes that something more is needed in 
international business, in addition to U.S. domestic law, to manage 
U.S.-listed companies’ social responsibility. One potential solution 
Ms. Williams suggests is monitoring U.S.-listed, transnational 
corporations through corporate disclosures and increased 
transparency.10 
The policy question this Article will address is whether Congress 
can shape transnational corporate social responsibility through 
disclosure requirements. In reaching a conclusion on that overarching 
policy question, the first question this Article asks is whether the new 
disclosure provisions change the social behaviors of companies 
involved in mineral production. Assuming that companies do adjust 
their behavior, the second question is whether those new behaviors 
achieve desired social outcomes. In other words, assuming that 
 
6 Id. at 13–16. 
7 Id. at 4. 
8 Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic 
Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 711–14 (2002). 
9 Id. at 708. 
10 Id. at 777. 
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disclosure laws can change corporate behavior, what is the feasibility 
of drafting a disclosure law that also produces socially acceptable 
results? 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I looks at the D.R. 
Congo’s history, the significance of mineral resources to the country, 
and the actions leading up to the enactment of Section 1502. Part II 
explains the basic requirements of Section 1502. In addition to the 
statutory provisions, I examine the legislative history to see what 
social and business factors motivated this bill. Then, I examine the 
regulations in the context of different academic perspectives on 
corporate social responsibility. I find that while Section 1502’s 
disclosure requirements did influence corporate behaviors, for various 
reasons those new behaviors did not alleviate the D.R. Congo’s 
humanitarian crisis. Part III discusses whether there is a problem with 
the predominant legal consensus on corporate social responsibility in 
transnational corporations. This section highlights Section 1502’s 
impact on mining in the D.R. Congo and disclosure effects on 
reporting companies. This Article concludes that the new disclosure 
laws are effective in creating a more transparent corporate operation, 
which allows shareholders to demand conflict-free products and 
forces companies to comply with those demands. Unfortunately, 
while disclosure laws promote responsible behaviors, they have not 
alleviated the greater humanitarian concerns in Central Africa, such as 
poor medical care, widespread displacement, and attacks on civilians. 
In fact, in addition to the steep implementation cost to U.S. 
companies, Section 1502 has had unintended negative effects on the 
D.R. Congo due to a de facto boycott on the country’s principal 
economic resources. Something more is needed. To the extent that 
disclosure laws are altering corporate behaviors but failing to remedy 
targeted social and economic issues, Congress needs new laws11 that 
promote a socially responsible corporate landscape. In my conclusion 
I suggest additional steps Congress may take in future legislation. 
 
11 Not necessarily more complex disclosures, rather disclosures that focus on 
addressing comprehensive reform. Reports of community contributions, work with 
nonprofit partners, and international bodies. For example, a disclosure regarding group(s) 
a corporation is working with to certify their socially responsible mining practices would 
be a low cost means to encourage socially responsible corporate behavior. 
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I 
CONFLICTS + MINERALS 
“Locally, everybody depends on mining!”12 
There are widely varying perspectives regarding the root causes 
and institutional problems in the D.R. Congo mining industry and 
economy. Activist groups, interested in drawing attention to the 
humanitarian crisis in Central Africa have used negative political 
campaign tactics to portray conflict minerals miners as gruesome 
killers. To say that all of the violence caused in the D.R. Congo stems 
from trade in conflict minerals, however, paints an incomplete picture 
of the country’s actual social and political dynamics. While there is 
some credence to activists’ charges, their shocking messages and the 
actual statistics do not always add up.13 First, this section presents the 
D.R. Congo, its history, and its mining industry. Second, this section 
highlights statistical data on mining in the D.R. Congo, and explains 
which minerals Congress has defined as “conflict minerals” in 
Section 1502. Finally, this section introduces the players in the past 
decade that have shaped the conflict mineral discussion. 
A. The Democratic Republic of the Congo 
The D.R. Congo is a country located in Central Africa. It is the 
second largest country in Africa, by area, and the eleventh largest in 
the world.14 With a population of over 73 million (July 2012 est.), the 
D.R. Congo is the nineteenth most populous nation in the world.15 
The economy is slowly recovering from decades of decline; 
corruption since independence in 1960, and two major wars that 
began in 1997 have contributed to reduced national growth, increased 
reliance on foreign debt, and the deaths of more than five million 
people from violence, famine, and disease.16  
 
12 Seay, supra note 4, at 8. 
13 Séverine Autesserre, Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and their 
Unintended Consequences, 111 AFR. AFF. 443, 210–11 (2012) (As Séverine Autesserre 
notes, despite the international community’s overwhelming focus on conflict minerals, 
only about 8% of Congolese conflicts are over natural resources.). 
14 CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Congo, Democratic Republic of the, THE WORLD 
FACTBOOK (2011), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg 
.html. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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The D.R. Congo has been mired in conflict for the better part of the 
last two decades. The First Congo War, which took place in the 
former state of Zaire, was the result of unstable neighboring countries 
and spillover violence involving refugees from the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide.17 The net effect was a new name, the D.R. Congo, and a 
new authoritarian ruler, Laurent-Désiré Kabila. The Second Congo 
War broke out in August 1998, and within weeks, six other countries 
had been drawn into the conflict along with scores of new militias in a 
battle for resources and regional power.18 The Second War officially 
ended in July 2003 when most foreign troops had withdrawn, yet 
scores of armed groups remained and hostilities persisted.19 As 
foreign troops withdrew, local combatants began looking to their 
territory within the country for sustenance, including enriching 
themselves at the cost of others’ livelihood and safety.20 
The International Rescue Committee (IRC), which carried out a 
study on the Second Congo War, said the war had caused upwards of 
3.9 million deaths, more than any other conflict since World War II.21 
According to the survey, less than 10% were attributable to 
violence.22 Most of the deaths were due to easily treatable diseases—
malaria, pneumonia, and malnutrition were the top killers.23 
Healthcare is still inaccessible, and the country has the lowest per 
capita spending on healthcare of any country in the world, an average 
of just $15 per person per year.24 
The D.R. Congo’s economy depends heavily on its mining 
industry.25 Some armed Congolese and foreign groups have fought to 
control the mineral trade in the country’s eastern regions, and some 
 
17 Id. 
18 Congo’s Curse, IRIN (July 20, 2006), http://www.irinnews.org/Report/61006 
/CONGO-Congo-s-Curse. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. (Mobutu, ruler of Zaire during the First Congo War, himself once asked FAZ 
soldiers why they needed pay when they were provided weapons.). 
21 Joe Bavier, Congo war-driven crisis kills 45,000 a month: study, REUTERS (Jan. 22, 
2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/22/us-congo-democratic-death-idUSL2280 
201220080122. 
22 Benjamin Coghlan et al., Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An 
Ongoing Crisis 1 (2007), http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/migrated/resources 
/2007/2006-7_congomortality survey.pdf [hereinafter Coghlan]. 
23 Bavier, supra note 21. 
24 Id. (compared to $6,000 per person per year in the United States). 
25 Seay, supra note 4, at 8 (“[The mining sector] accounts for 80% of the exports, 72% 
of the national budget and 28% of GDP according to the latest available statistics.”). 
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groups that engage in mining activities are also responsible for 
civilian-directed violence.26 Not all violence in the eastern D.R. 
Congo, however, is related to the mineral trade.27 And violent groups 
do not control all of the mines.28 Moreover, despite the violence, the 
eastern region is still dependent on mineral trading as a livelihood.29 
For many Congolese families, “mining activity is generational and 
represents their only potential economic livelihood.”30 The violence-
conflict mineral connection focused international attention on the 
D.R. Congo, but any policy concentrated solely on ameliorating 
conflict mineral violence falls short of addressing chief causes of the 
country’s plight. 
B. Conflict Minerals 
“Conflict mineral” is an artful term, similar to the “blood diamond” 
moniker used in Liberia by activist groups to engender political and 
monetary support from the West. There is some truth to the term, as 
conflict minerals are physically connected to the D.R. Congo and 
finance certain armed groups within the country. Their abundance in 
the D.R. Congo makes them a natural symbol for the country, and 
their abundant use in modern technology connects them to the 
western world. 
United States legislation defines “conflict minerals” as cassiterite, 
columbite-tantalite, wolframite, and gold (more commonly known by 
their derivatives as tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold) and other 
minerals the Secretary of State determines to be financing conflict in 
the D.R. Congo and its neighboring countries.31 Currently, only the 
three T’s and gold are determined to be funding conflict: Tin, “used in 
alloys, tin plating, and solders for joining pipes and electric circuits”; 
Tantalum, “used in electronic components, including mobile 
telephones, computers, video game consoles, and digital cameras, and 
as an alloy for making carbide tools and jet engine components”; 
Tungsten, “used for metal wire, electrodes, and contacts in lighting, 
electronic, heating, and welding applications”; and Gold, “used for 
 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274 (final rule Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 
C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b). 
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making jewelry and is used in electronic, communications, and 
aerospace equipment.”32 The D.R. Congo’s supply of these minerals 
is believed to be enormous. The D.R. Congo contains an estimated 80 
percent of the world’s tantalum reserves.33 Gold deposits remain 
underexplored, but are also estimated to be vast.34 
With the mineral trade constituting such a large portion of the 
country’s economy, activist groups posited that enlisting Western 
support to stop conflict mineral funding was the most effective and 
direct means to attract attention and help the country recover from its 
prolonged depressed state.35 The goal of these groups—to end and 
prevent conflict in Africa—has remained unchanged, but their 
strategy for rallying Western support has shifted dramatically. Early 
advocacy focused on the internal violence and humanitarian crisis and 
called for a multi-pronged approach to solve the complex problems 
within the D.R. Congo. In 2009, the focus shifted away from complex 
solutions, and instead connected the Congolese crisis to Westerners in 
a way they could identify with. One group, the Enough Project, 
cleverly linked the three Ts and gold to the symbol of Western 
electronic achievement, the cell phone.36 
C. Western Involvement 
Promoting responsible corporate practices in the D.R. Congo is a 
recent phenomenon. Prior to the late 2000s, there was little attention 
on the country’s situation.37 That indifference began to fade in 2007, 
 
32 Id. at 55,283–84. 
33 Conflict Minerals, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, https://www.gov.uk 
/conflict-minerals (last visited Oct. 8, 2013) [hereinafter FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH 
OFFICE]; but see Andrew Behl, Marci McCall, Sarah Spring, HEWLETT-PACKARD: 
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT MINERALS 2 (2011) (citing that the D.R. Congo might have 
less of those resources: 18% of global tantalum production, 4% of tin, 3% of tungsten, and 
2% of gold). Since predicting the supply of minerals that have not yet been discovered is 
difficult, these estimates vary dramatically and tend to vary depending on the source of 
information and reasons for reporting. 
34 FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, supra note 34. 
35 Conflict Minerals, THE ENOUGH PROJECT, http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org 
/content/initiatives/conflict-minerals (last visited Dec. 2, 2012) (“The movement is 
growing, with celebrities like Emmanuelle Chriqui, Emile Hirsch, Ryan Gosling, Iman, 
Julianne Moore, Brooke Smith and Ken Baumann adding their voices.”). 
36 John Prendergast, Can You Hear Congo Now? Cell Phones, Conflict Minerals, and 
the Worst Sexual Violence in the World, THE ENOUGH PROJECT 2 (Apr. 2009), 
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Can%20Your%20Hear%20Congo%20Now.pdf. 
37 Seay, supra note 4, at 8. 
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when the Enough Project “was created with the primary purpose of 
developing an American constituency around ending and preventing 
conflict in Africa.”38 Early efforts by the Enough Project favored 
acknowledging the complex issues facing the Congolese people and 
advancing a comprehensive solution.39 This initial approach did not 
receive enduring support.40 With a modified message and new media 
tactics, however, the Enough Project turned Western attention to the 
conflicts in the D.R. Congo. 
In 2009, the Enough Project shifted its focus to “conflict minerals” 
in an attempt to galvanize grassroots activists around the D.R. Congo 
humanitarian crisis and built a broad Western constituency.41 The 
Enough Project released the strategy paper “Can You Hear Congo 
Now? Cell Phones, Conflict Minerals, and the Worst Sexual Violence 
in the World,” which directly linked Western consumers’ ownership 
of electronics to sexual and other forms of violence in the D.R. 
Congo.42 The activists’ focus on consumer electronics, particularly 
cell phones, as a means of tying consumers to the crisis in the D.R. 
Congo was effective in making people feel that they were connected 
to the problem and could make a difference.43 Following the adoption 
of this strategy, advocacy groups proliferated, media coverage of the 
D.R. Congo increased, and donations poured into organizations 
working in the region.44 
The Enough Project also pursued relationships with several leading 
corporations that did business in the D.R. Congo. The most 
responsive of these corporations was Hewlett-Packard, which 
maneuvered to the forefront of conflict mineral awareness among 
multinational corporations.45 Industry watchdog groups ranked 
companies based on the elimination of conflict minerals from their 
processes. Most companies that received high marks worked on 
“Stakeholder Engagement,” defined as working with an Enough 
Project-led coalition, which was, and still is, one of the indicators 
 
38 Id. at 9. 
39 Id. 
40 See id. 
41 Id. 
42 Prendergast, supra note 36, at 2. 
43 Seay, supra note 4, at 9. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
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used to determine rankings.46 Shortly thereafter, other electronics 
giants like Apple and Intel followed Hewlett-Packard’s lead, 
instituting a transparent and conflict-free supply chain for their own 
products. 
The Enough Project’s association between cell phones, mining, and 
violence in the D.R. Congo was a useful, simplified message to 
capture Western attention, while the actual link is much more 
tenuous. Moreover, the Congolese economy is largely dependent on 
mineral trading, both violent and non-violent. As several authors note, 
“tantalum mining has become a critical mode of survival for many at 
the grassroots” level of Congolese society.47 In terms of fostering 
dynamic social change, it remains to be seen whether the attention 
garnered by the Enough Project’s marketing efforts will result in 
resources for essential infrastructure and public support projects. 
Regardless, the Enough Project’s efforts grabbed Congress’s attention 
and produced legislation that now requires companies to make their 
mineral supply chains more transparent. 
II 
DODD-FRANK CONFLICT MINERAL DISCLOSURE 
“[W]hen there is but a single regulator, such that exit by the 
regulated is no longer an option, an essential check on excessive 
regulation is lost.”48 
The legislative mandate known as Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank 
was a result of the Enough Project’s campaign to draw attention to the 
conflicts in Africa and the D.R. Congo. Unfortunately, because the 
Enough Project’s initial, more comprehensive social programs failed 
to gather support, the new legislation more closely reflects the 
Enough Project’s revamped approach linking armed conflict in the 
D.R. Congo to cell phones and other electronics. Thus, rather than 
focusing on treatable diseases, inadequate medical treatment, and 
other direct causes of deaths, the bill instead focused on a less 
complex, but readily identifiable link, conflict minerals. While 
 
46 Getting to Conflict Free: Assessing Corporate Action on Conflict Minerals, THE 
ENOUGH PROJECT (Dec. 2010), http://www.enoughproject.org/files/publications/corporate 
_action-1.pdf. 
47 Seay, supra note 4, at 8 (citing Stephen Jackson, Making a Killing: Criminality and 
Coping in the Kivu War Economy, 93/94 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 515, 515 (2002)). 
48 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round 
II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1795 (2011). 
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corporations who trade in minerals from the D.R. Congo have already 
adjusted their supply-chains, it remains to be seen how these new 
regulations will solve the ongoing humanitarian crisis. 
A. Legislative Mandate 
The title of Section 1502(a) states the “Sense of the Congress on 
Exploitation and Trade of Conflict Minerals Originating in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo,” which reflects Congress’s 
intention to further the humanitarian goal of ending the violent 
conflict in the D.R. Congo. Despite this noble goal and some measure 
of success, many questions remain about the ultimate impact of 
solving diminishing49 conflict issues while sidestepping the greater 
infrastructure and social funding difficulties facing a country ravaged 
by two decades of war. Regardless, the SEC regulations authorized by 
Section 1502 further explain that the involvement in mineral trading 
by armed groups50 is helping to finance the conflict and that the 
humanitarian crisis in the region warrants the disclosure 
requirements.51 
Section 1502 does not mesh with Dodd-Frank’s primary focus on 
domestic financial stability and reform. Instead, it mandates the SEC 
to impose disclosure requirements on U.S.-listed companies that use, 
or potentially use, conflict minerals52 from the D.R. Congo or an 
adjoining country53 in their products. The legislative history of 
 
49 Coghlan, supra note 22, at 1 (this is not to marginalize the effects of conflict around 
mines, which have led to horrific instances of rape and forced servitude. However, in the 
time since the Second War ended, crimes related to violence have subsided substantially, 
with some estimates placing the decline at 30% per year). 
50 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,364 (final rule Sept. 12, 2012) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b). (“[A]rmed group” means a group that is identified 
as a perpetrator of serious human rights abuses in the most recently issued annual Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices relating to the Democratic Republic of the Congo or 
an adjoining country for the year the annual report is due). 
51 Id. at 56275 (“It is the sense of the Congress that the exploitation and trade of 
conflict minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is helping to 
finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence in the eastern Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, particularly sexual- and gender- based violence, and contributing 
to an emergency humanitarian situation therein, warranting the provisions of section 13(p) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as added by subsection (b).”). 
52 Id. at 56364. (“conflict mineral” means “(i) [c]olumbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite, 
gold, wolframite, or their derivatives . . . ; or (ii) [a]ny other mineral or its derivatives 
determined by the Secretary of State to be financing conflict in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo or an adjoining country.”). 
53 Id. (“adjoining country” means “a country that shares an internationally recognized 
border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo”). 
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Section 1502 explains that Congress was concerned with human-
rights objectives and preventing the proliferation of minerals that are 
obtained at the Congolese people’s expense.54 Notably, however, 
neither Section 1502 nor the SEC’s regulations impose sanctions for 
using minerals that are not “conflict free”; the only affirmative 
requirement is disclosure. 
B. Disclosure Requirements 
On September 12, 2012, pursuant to Section 1502, the SEC 
adopted its final rules that require companies to disclose their use of 
or involvement with four types of minerals,55 if the minerals 
originated in the D.R. Congo or an adjoining country. The rules apply 
to certain issuers (U.S.-listed companies) that file reports with the 
SEC under Exchange Act Sections 13(a) or 15(d).56 The disclosure 
requirements for conflict minerals are further broken into three steps. 
In the first step, a company must determine whether it is subject to 
the Conflict Minerals Statutory Provision. A company is subject to 
the provision if conflict minerals are “necessary to the functionality or 
production of a product manufactured, or contracted to be 
manufactured.”57 If a company does not meet the definition, then no 
disclosure is required.58 If a company does meet this definition, it 
must move on to step two.59 
The second step requires a company to conduct a reasonable 
country-of-origin inquiry for all of its conflict minerals to determine 
whether they originated in the D.R. Congo. If the minerals were found 
not to have originated in the D.R. Congo, then a company would have 
 
54 Id. at 56,275. 
55 See Conflict Minerals, supra note 51 (for a list of the current “conflict minerals”). 
56 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a) and 78o(d), respectively. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
was created to provide governance of securities transactions on the secondary market 
(after issue) and regulate the exchanges and broker-dealers in order to protect the investing 
public. Definition of ‘Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,’ INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/seact1934.asp#ixzz2DfQ8zyqj (last visited Dec. 2, 
2012). The SEC was established from the 1934 Act. Id. All companies listed on stock 
exchanges must follow the requirements set forth in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
Id. In other words, every publically traded U.S. company must comply with the new SEC 
conflict mineral rules of disclosure. 
57 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,285 (final rule Sept. 12, 2012) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b). 
58 Id. at 56,287–88. 
59 Id. 
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to report this conclusion, as well as the process used to come to this 
conclusion, on its annual report and Internet website.60 A company 
would then have no further disclosure requirements. 
A third step—preparing a Conflict Minerals Report61—is required 
if any of three situations arise. The three situations which may 
constitute a need to prepare a Conflict Minerals Report are: (1) a 
company determines that its conflict minerals did originate in the 
D.R. Congo, (2) the company is unable to determine that its conflict 
minerals did not originate from D.R. Congo, or (3) the company 
determines that its conflict minerals were from recycled or scrap 
sources. The Conflict Minerals Report process includes obtaining a 
certified independent private sector audit report, furnishing such 
information as an exhibit to the company’s annual report, and posting 
the information on its website.62 For any products containing conflict 
minerals obtained from the D.R. Congo, but that do not “directly or 
indirectly finance or benefit armed groups,” a company would be 
permitted to label the product “DRC conflict free.”63 However, for 
products containing conflict minerals, for which a company was 
unable to determine whether they “directly or indirectly finance[d] or 
benefit[ed] armed groups,” a company would be required to label 
them “not DRC conflict free.”64 
Despite the length of the new regulations, 356 pages in all, there is 
still plenty of ambiguity. For instance, what makes conflict minerals 
“necessary”? The SEC admits that they “do not propose to define 
when a conflict mineral is necessary to the functionality or production 
of a product.”65 Suggested interpretations of “necessary” include an 
NGO proposal for cases where conflict minerals are “intentionally 
added”; two bill sponsors advised “all uses of conflict minerals . . . 
except . . . unintentionally included” minerals; and the SEC’s negative 
definition, “conflict minerals necessary to the functionality or 
production of a physical tool or machine used to produce a product 
would not be considered necessary to the production of the product 
 
60 See 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,316–33 (final rule Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b) (for an explanation of the Conflict Minerals Report). 
61 See infra note 62 (for an explanation of the Conflict Minerals Report). 
62 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,311–16 (final rule Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
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even if that tool or machine is necessary to producing the product.”66 
The many plausible definitions and the SEC’s refusal to settle on one 
add to the confusion, which may lead to higher costs for companies, 
keep them from addressing the conflict-mineral issue, or incentivize 
them to avoid purchasing minerals from the D.R. Congo altogether. 
Even before Congress enacted Section 1502, an active corporate 
and international debate emerged over how to increase corporate 
accountability for the tragedies in the D.R. Congo. Only recently did 
the option to replace market demands with a mandatory federal law 
become a possibility. Although lawmakers likely have good 
intentions, the Congressional debate on Section 1502 was 
abbreviated,67 and the resulting SEC requirements are a one-size-fits-
all law.68 The estimated cost to corporations of implementing the new 
SEC disclosure provisions is approximately $4 billion,69 although 
some estimates go as high as $7.98 billion,70 and all annual reporting 
requirements went into effect on January 1, 2013.71 
C. Impact on Transnational Corporate Social Responsibility 
Some would argue that Section 1502 reflects a necessary addition 
to the predominant legal consensus on corporate social responsibility 
in transnational corporations. Where international law might 
otherwise have been inadequate, shareholders can now access more 
information and voice concerns to hold profit-motivated corporations 
accountable for their business decisions. In contrast, detractors of 
federal corporate legislation would contend this is opportunistic, 
incomplete, and inexcusable federal governance in the international 
 
66 Id. 
67 Despite the two-year period (December 2010–August 2012) between when the SEC 
proposed rules and adopted the final rules, the three-step disclosure process did not 
change. 
68 Although comments on the proposed rules suggested varying applicability depending 
on company size, type of product, or quantity of conflict minerals, the disclosure 
requirements will apply equally for all U.S. listed companies. Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 56,274, 56,278 (final rule Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 
249b). 
69 Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at SEC Open 
Meeting: Proposed Rule to Implement Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act–the “Conflict 
Minerals” Provision (Aug 22, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news 
/speech/2012/spch082212dmg-minerals.htm). 
70 Seay, supra note 4, at 12. 
71 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,275 (final rule Sept. 12, 2012) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b). 
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arena.72 They might be right. To the extent that the problems in the 
D.R. Congo are actually a lack of infrastructure and poor medical 
care, Section 1502 does not provide a viable solution because conflict 
minerals do not primarily create those problems. Further, the timing 
of Section 1502 is questionable—rushed through Congress by activist 
groups during a tough economic time, when passing legislation 
becomes easier. Finally, corporate disclosures are not without 
consequence. They put the United States at an economic disadvantage 
vis-à-vis other countries’ security exchanges.73 Without a doubt, some 
good will come from Section 1502; companies preemptively 
supported conflict-free supply chains and other socially impactful 
projects. However, Congress needs to be circumspect when passing 
disclosure laws—there are positive and negative effects that 
accompany corporate regulation. 
1. Corporate Social Responsibility in a Transnational Environment 
To evaluate whether corporate actions are socially acceptable this 
article utilizes the predominant legal consensus on corporate 
responsibility in the United States—corporations that operate within 
American laws are considered socially responsible. In her article, 
Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 
Professor Williams posits that (from among many choices) the 
predominant legal consensus is appropriate for examining corporate 
social responsibility in domestic situations.74 However, in 
transnational situations, Professor Williams questions the theory’s 
efficacy as a complete corporate social responsibility theory. 
There are three essential premises on which the predominant legal 
consensus on corporate social responsibility rests. The first premise is 
that the corporation’s main purpose is to maximize shareholder 
 
72 Bainbridge, supra note 48, at 1785–86 (describing how the burst of an economic 
bubble causes an upswing in populist anger and accompanying intense public pressure for 
legislative action, which gives well-positioned policy entrepreneurs a window to market 
their regulatory solutions). 
73 Professor Bainbridge argues that if a state were to make disadvantageous changes to 
its law, some companies listed there would leave and other companies would not decide to 
move there. There is substantial evidence that state competition tends to lead to efficient 
results and positive shareholder returns. This finding strongly supports the corporate race-
to-the-top hypothesis. By eliminating disadvantageous disclosure laws, the United States 
stays ahead of the competition from other securities exchanges lurking as potential 
competitors for U.S.-listed businesses. See id. 
74 Williams, supra note 8, at 712–13. 
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wealth.75 The second premise is that—given the purpose of the 
corporation is to generate profits—the only accountability of the 
corporation is to shareholders (as opposed to stakeholders—including 
employees—who are considered outsiders).76 This premise accepts a 
shareholder-primacy viewpoint, although this viewpoint may not fully 
capture all of a public corporation’s inner workings.77 The third 
premise is that a corporation is socially responsible when it stays 
within the constraints of U.S. law.78 In other words, our laws 
sufficiently address any concerns about the exercise of corporate 
power, and society will benefit most from profit-focused entities that 
stay within that moral fabric of U.S. law.79 
Professor Williams sees three issues with the predominant 
corporate ideology in the transnational environment. First, the 
transnational environment undermines the ability of sovereign nations 
to impose substantive, proactive limits on economic actors such as 
transnational corporations and capital market participants.80 Second, 
since there is no international sovereign, the power of nations to tax 
corporate enterprises and spend money on social welfare benefits to 
address distributive concerns arising from globalization is waning, 
although it is far from fully diminished.81 Third, when there are 
instances that can be understood as a breakdown in corporate social 
responsibility, law is often insufficient to provide redress.82 Therefore, 
Professor Williams proposes that there is a need for something more 
in transnational business to compliment optimistic reliance on the 
 
75 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439, 448 (2001). 
76 Id. at 441. 
77 For example, Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have suggested that as an 
economic matter, the fundamental structure of a public corporation is an instance of team 
production. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249 (1999). The team production model requires firm-specific 
commitments from employees, managers, and even the communities where the businesses 
are located. Id. at 275. All of the constituents contribute inputs that are necessary for the 
corporation’s success, and receive part of the benefits from the wealth created. Id. at 285. 
78 Williams, supra note 8, at 714. 
79 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); see also Milton 
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32. 
80 Williams, supra note 8, at 725–36. 
81 Id. at 746–50. 
82 Id. at 750–64. 
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theory of shareholder wealth maximization and the constraints of 
domestic law. 
a. “Something More” 
One proposition for filling the void in international law is increased 
corporate disclosures, which would not change how corporations to 
operate, but would implement a duty on companies to provide 
shareholders with more information about their operations. Disclosure 
laws are used as a shaming mechanism. By alerting shareholders to 
offensive corporate practices, the laws can indirectly modify 
substantive corporate practices through shareholder demands.83 
Disclosure laws can succeed to the extent that they engender enough 
shareholder displeasure to force a change in corporate activities.84 
Professor Williams anticipates that disclosure laws for 
transnational businesses would increase transparency: aligning public 
interest85 and shareholder demand and, therefore, corporate 
accountability without completely reshaping the predominant model 
of corporate social responsibility. In other words, the shareholders’ 
awareness of a company’s actions may instill some humanistic 
concerns into an otherwise profit-focused industry and ruthless global 
market. For example, in the shareholder say on pay debate, 
proponents argued that shareholder advisory opinions on corporate 
officer pay would help boards of directors overcome psychological 
barriers and negotiate pay packages with CEOs more effectively on 
behalf of shareholders.86 Similarly, shareholder demand for conflict-
mineral-free products may create leeway for corporate officers to 
focus on social accountability measures rather than profit-
maximization, while staying within the shareholder-primacy model of 
corporate governance. 
Skeptics of federally mandated disclosure laws see the federal 
regulations as upsetting corporate market efficiency by tinkering with 
the shareholder-stakeholder balance. Professor Steven Bainbridge’s 
 
83 See, e.g., Alison Torbitt, Implementing Corporate Climate Change Responsibility: 
Possible State Legislative and Sec Responses to Climate Change Through Corporate Law 
Reform, 88 OR. L. REV. 581 (2009) (for an example of how SEC social disclosures can 
impact corporate climate change responsibility). 
84 Id. at 616. 
85 However minor that interest may be, the goal is to incorporate the interest while once 
again highlighting the importance of transparency law aspirations. 
86 Randall S. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will It Lead to a Greater Role 
for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213, 1228 (2012). 
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critique of “therapeutic” corporate governance laws is that they 
ostensibly require disclosure but are clearly intended to change 
underlying behavior.87 Further, since activist-policy groups tend to be 
critics of markets and corporations, their laws often include regulation 
that penalizes useful and proven models and practices, and, more 
generally, suppresses risk-taking by punishing negative results and 
minimizing the rewards for success.88 
In line with Professor Bainbridge’s critique, Section 1502 has 
nothing to do with the financial crisis that supported its passage. To 
the extent that Section 1502 was passed after groups were already 
tracking conflict mineral supply chains, it epitomizes excessive 
disclosure laws passed during times of economic boom and bust, 
which place U.S.-listed companies at a disadvantage vis-à-vis 
companies on other security exchanges.89 There is ample evidence 
that shows this was the case. A number of efforts were underway 
prior to the enactment of Section 1502 that included consultations 
with local civil society leaders and Congolese mineral trade exports. 
For example, an effort called PROMINES (an acronym for improving 
and strengthening the Congolese mining industry) involving the 
Congolese government, the World Bank, and the mining industry had 
made great strides toward improving transparency and 
accountability.90 This effort was out of the public view, 
internationally low-key, and had a high probability of success until 
confusion set in surrounding the enactment of Section 1502.91 By 
utilizing methods other than corporate regulation, the efforts could 
have permitted a viable solution to the conflict-mineral dilemma 
without further burdening U.S. companies and stifling trade. 
b. Corporate Response to the SEC’s Conflict Mineral Disclosure 
Rules 
Disclosure laws are effective only to the extent that companies act 
in conformance with the law’s underlying policy goals. The SEC 
 
87 Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 1797. 
88 Id. at 1787. While Bainbridge is concerned with the issues of internal corporate 
governance and state versus federal regulation, surely, quack social policy legislation that 
removed corporate decision making and replaced it with a one-size-fits-all federal law 
would irk him in a similar fashion. 
89 Id. at 1819. 
90 Seay, supra note 4, at 20. 
91 Id. 
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regulations provide evidence that disclosure laws can effect 
substantive changes in transnational corporations. In 2010, the SEC 
released its proposed disclosure regulations pursuant to Section 1502. 
Companies using minerals in the D.R. Congo region responded even 
though the SEC’s would not release its final regulations for another 
two years. 
Hewlett-Packard started a movement to use conflict-free sourcing 
programs, and transnational corporate superpowers Intel, Apple, and 
Boeing, among many others quickly adjusted their sourcing practices 
as well. The amount of groups promoting responsible sourcing has 
also increased. In all, there has been a huge shift by U.S.-listed 
companies to practicing conflict-free mineral sourcing.92 Of course 
the threat of disclosures and shift to more responsible practices does 
not prevent companies from putting a positive spin on their efforts; 
Hewlett-Packard boasts its support for the Solutions for Hope project, 
which “achieved the first validated source of conflict-free tantalum 
ore from [the] D.R. Congo,”93 and Apple proclaims it is at the 
forefront of an effort “to help its suppliers source conflict-free 
materials.”94 Section 1502 and the subsequent SEC regulations have 
substantially altered corporate activities regarding conflict mining. 
However, insofar as the ultimate concern is the law’s impact on the 
humanitarian crisis in the D.R. Congo, the results have been far less 
impressive. 
2. Problems with Reflexive Federal Legislation 
Most activist groups’ marketing strategy is relatively 
straightforward: identify a problem and rally public support to your 
cause. Unfortunately, mass attention grabbing often means that 
complex policy and reasoned discussion are reduced to a basic 
message and sound bites. The Enough Project put the D.R. Congo’s 
 
92 The most easily identifiable indicator might be the stark difference between U.S.-
listed companies and Asian companies’ response to Section 1502. The Chinese have 
recently opened a trading post in North Kivu; they make cell phones as well, and do not 
feel the need to participate in transparency schemes the way Western companies do. And 
because they know they are the only purchaser in town, they are buying at a steep 
discount. David Aronson, How Congress Devastated Congo, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/08/opinion/how-congress-devastated-congo.html. 
93 Global Citizenship, HEWLETT-PACKARD, http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/global 
citizenship/society/ethics.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2012). 
94 Supplier Responsibility: Labor and Human Rights, APPLE, http://www.apple 
.com/supplierresponsibility/code-of-conduct/labor-and-human-rights .html (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2012). 
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plight on Western minds through shrewd messaging and attention-
grabbing headlines, but the issue is whether those marketing 
techniques will engender a response that addresses the core problems 
within the D.R. Congo, or just one factor. 
There are many issues with reflexive policy implementation that 
are highlighted in the D.R. Congo crisis. Instead of providing 
meaningful solutions, the pressure of time tends to give advantages to 
activist policy groups who have prepackaged purported solutions that 
can readily be molded into legislation.95 The problem is that this type 
of legislation creates a new rule that favors a specific interest group’s 
agenda, which assuredly does not represent companies’ (i.e., 
shareholders’) interests and may not represent all Congolese (i.e., 
stakeholder) interests, either. In addition, some observers of the D.R. 
Congo reject the notion that conflict minerals are the primary driver 
of the humanitarian crisis and contend that disclosures only solve one 
part of a much more complex problem. Professor Laura Seay argues 
that while the horrific nature of the violence in the D.R. Congo draws 
political attention to the area, many have overstated the potential that 
a traceability and transparency scheme would have for alleviating 
some of that violence.96 Although supportive of international attention 
and aid, Professor Seay’s perspective aligns more closely with 
Professor Bainbridge’s fear of quack federal legislation in times of 
economic boom and bust.97 
This seems to be the case with Section 1502, where the Enough 
Project and other activists pushed through an agenda that narrowly 
focuses on one policy issue without providing solutions for the many 
layers of a complex problem. To the extent that the problems in the 
D.R. Congo are a lack of infrastructure and inadequate medical 
attention, Section 1502 does not propose a solution. Instead, as 
Professor Bainbridge cautioned, the Enough Project succeeded in 
drawing Western attention to the D.R. Congo but failed to address the 
overarching social problems that require a more comprehensive 
approach. On the other hand, the Enough Project might have 
purposefully chosen the only battle they could win in Congress, and 
some progress in the D.R. Congo is better than the status quo. 
 
95 Bainbridge, supra note 48, at 1786. 
96 Seay, supra note 4, at 23. 
97 Bainbridge, supra note 48, at 1785–86 (the author defines “quack federal legislation” 
as the post-economic bubble legislation that tends to favor market regulatory agendas with 
minimal, if any, substantive legislative deliberation). 
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Recognizing the inherent limitations of a single activist group, there is 
certainly reason for optimism that the Enough Project has pushed the 
social and political discussion of corporate responsibility in a positive 
direction and shown the path for others to follow. 
3. Distinguishing Section 1502 from Quack Federal Legislation 
Despite the post-bubble legislation that makes up Section 1502, the 
potential negative impact may not be as troublesome because the law 
applies to transnational, rather than domestic, business activities. One 
issue typically raised with reflexive federal legislation is that it takes 
decision-making away from the laboratory of the states and places it 
with the federal government, deleting the fifty states’ experimental 
capabilities and placing regulatory power with one legislative body.98 
A second issue with crisis legislation is that it typically is void of any 
sunset provisions, which would allow the legislative body or some 
overseer to revisit the legislation after the time pressure of a crisis 
subsides. These critiques, although fair as to some Dodd-Frank 
provisions, are not nearly as damning to Section 1502. 
With Section 1502’s enactment, the federal government is only one 
of many bodies attempting to rectify the humanitarian situation in the 
D.R. Congo. For example, there are numerous other countries and 
securities exchanges that will not be affected by the SEC’s disclosure 
requirements. While U.S. companies may suffer the consequences of 
excessive disclosure, the laboratory of international competition will 
still thrive. Other securities exchanges, although not as financially 
robust as the United States’, including London, Tokyo, and Hong 
Kong, can allow their companies to compete with the United States’ 
without imposing disclosure requirements. Similar to domestic 
corporate law where states like Nevada and Pennsylvania are on deck 
should Delaware stop providing the most advantageous corporate law, 
other countries could potentially lure companies away from the 
United States if corporate disclosure requirements become too 
burdensome. 
Another critique of the Dodd-Frank legislation, and Congress when 
it legislates in crisis situations generally, is that no statutory 
safeguards, like sunset provisions, are included to allow issues to be 
revisited when there is more time for deliberation.99 Section 1502, 
 
98 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(noting that states are “the laboratories of novel social and economic experiments”). 
99 Bainbridge, supra note 48, at 1820. 
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however, does contain a “semi-sunset provision” which allows the 
President to retract the reporting requirements after five years, 
presumably when the effects of conflict minerals are diminished.100 
Critics would prefer a sunset provision that allowed for the entirety of 
the Congressional bill to be revisited, but at least there is room for an 
overseer to revisit the legislation after the 2008 financial crisis has 
subsided. 
III 
CHANGES, IMPACT, AND “SOMETHING MORE” (AGAIN) 
“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”101 
A. Changes in Corporate Behavior and Impact on Congolese 
Miners 
U.S.-listed corporations have changed their position on conflict 
minerals, beginning with the SEC releasing its proposed rules. Apple 
was very much aware of the situation; even the late Steve Jobs, in a 
personal response to a customer email, addressed the issue directly.102 
Changing the most powerful companies’ and CEOs’ behavior proves 
that transparency is a powerful tool for shaping corporate social 
responsibility. 
Disclosure provisions, however, can also have unintended 
consequences. In the case of say on pay, “more disclosure likely 
allowed executives to know what other executives were paid and to 
demand higher pay for themselves.”103 In this case, the SEC 
disclosure requirements impose substantial discovery and production 
 
100 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (2012) (stating that the provision “shall terminate on the 
date on which the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional 
committees . . . that no armed groups continue to be directly involved and benefitting from 
commercial activity involving conflict minerals”). 
101 What Publicity Can Do, HARPERS WKLY. (Dec. 20, 1913) (quoting Justice Louis 
Brandeis). 
102 See Brian X. Chen, In E-Mail, Steve Jobs Comments on iPhone 4 Minerals, WIRED 
(June 28, 2010, 2:18 PM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2010/06/steve-jobs-iphone4/ 
(statement of Steve Jobs) (“Yes. We require all of our suppliers to certify in writing that 
they use conflict [free] materials. But honestly there is no way for them to be sure.  Until 
someone invents a way to chemically trace minerals from the source mine, it is a very 
difficult problem.”). 
103 Steven M. Davidoff, Humanitarian Effort in Congo Puts SEC in Unintended Role, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/28/humanitarian-effort 
-in-congo-puts-wall-st-regulator-in-unintended-role/. 
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costs on companies, likely without proportional social benefits and 
with potentially negative social impacts. 
The effect of Apple’s and other corporations’ decisions to “exit the 
D.R. Congo mineral trade means that there is now a de facto boycott 
on Congolese tungsten, tantalum, and cassiterite.”104 Although some 
companies continue to purchase minerals from the D.R. Congo, the 
majority of mineral smelting companies, which used to buy from 
eastern Congo, have stopped. No company wants the stigma of 
financing African warlords.105 It is easier to avoid the D.R. Congo 
altogether and purchase from other, safer, unencumbered countries 
than to sort out the complexities of Congolese politics.106 
Diminished corporate interest in the Congolese mineral trade has 
been devastating for local communities.107 Although “Congolese 
artisanal miners normally work under horrific conditions for little pay 
[…] in most mining communities it is the only paid employment 
available,”108 and it is still legitimate and legal work for many.109 
With no work alternatives except subsistence agriculture or joining a 
militia, the Congolese are in trouble. Questions remain about the 
extent to which the final rules will advance their humanitarian goal or 
actually make the situation worse.110 
American corporate competitiveness further compounds the 
regulatory environment. There is a possibility that American 
corporations will suffer market disadvantages without solving the 
conflict.111 This problem not only extends to current U.S.-listed 
 
104 Seay, supra note 4. 
105 David Aronson, How Congress Devastated Congo, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/08/opinion/how-congress-devastated-congo.html 
(especially high-profile tech firms like Apple and Intel that are often the end purchasers of 
these minerals). 
106 Id. 
107 Seay, supra note 4. 
108 Id. 
109 Aronson, supra note 106 (“The Rev. Didier de Failly, a Belgian priest who has lived 
in Congo for 45 years, insistently warned Western advocacy groups of the dangers posed 
by their campaign. He told them it was no defense for them to claim that they weren’t 
proposing an embargo, since what they were doing would inevitably lead to one.”). 
110 Davidoff, supra note 104 (citing the justification of S.E.C. commissioner, Troy A. 
Paredes, who voted against the rules because they failed to assess the extent to which they 
would in fact be successful). 
111 Aronson, supra note 106. The bottom ten of the Enough Project’s conflict mineral 
company rankings list are all Asian companies, for whom these rules are not likely to 
apply. Conflict Minerals Company Bankings, RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO, available at 
http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/conflict-minerals-company -rankings. 
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corporations, but it might also deter future corporations and mining 
companies from incorporating in the United States. While the Enough 
Project remains publically confident that the regulations are 
working,112 other business groups,113 and even the Congolese people 
themselves,114 remain skeptical. 
B. “Something More” (Again) 
The people of the D.R. Congo agree that it is beneficial to bring 
greater transparency to their mineral trade. A variety of local and 
international initiatives were already in place or getting underway 
when the SEC requirements were enacted. Some groups used tracing 
tags on mineral bags from conflict-free areas as a way of regulating 
trade and promoting awareness.115 Groups such as the Electronic 
Industry Citizenship Coalition, PROMINES, and local coalitions were 
also involved in creating a solution. Those efforts may now become a 
casualty of Section 1502. 
There are other ways to improve mining conditions without further 
deteriorating the D.R. Congo’s infrastructure. A few possibilities 
include providing monetary assistance to affected mining 
communities,116 hiring displaced workers as taggers or otherwise 
involving them in the tracing program, and collaborating with local 
participants to implement Section 1502’s requirements.117 These 
policies do not necessarily fit well with the shareholder-primacy 
 
112 Davidoff, supra note 104 (“According to Darren Fenwick, senior government affairs 
manager of the Enough Project, ‘Even before implementation, the conflict rules have 
served as a catalyst for companies and countries to already take steps to prevent usage of 
illicit conflict minerals.’”). 
113 Id. (Thomas P. Quaadman, vice president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s 
Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, wrote in the Congressional newspaper The 
Hill, that it was uncertain whether these rules worked and that there was a likely 
possibility of “negative consequences for American businesses.”). 
114 Digging for Victory, ECONOMIST (Sept. 24, 2011), available at http://www 
.economist.com/node /21530110 (“[t]hey denounce the Enough Project, a group backed by 
several Hollywood stars, that was instrumental in imposing what they call a de facto 
embargo.”) (emphasis added). 
115 Aronson, supra note 106. 
116 CENT, INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Congo, Democratic Republic of the, THE WORLD 
FACTBOOK (2011), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg 
.html (showing that D.R. Congo joined the Organization for the Harmonization of 
Business Law in Africa Treaty, with sixteen other African states to facilitate and 
encourage both domestic and foreign investment in the member states). 
117 Seay, supra note 4, at 26. 
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model, but perhaps “something more” than relying on influential, yet 
misguided corporate disclosure laws is needed to produce acceptable 
transnational corporate social responsibility. 
CONCLUSION 
The SEC’s new disclosure rules have changed U.S.-listed 
corporations’ relationships with conflict minerals. Arguably, 
shareholders were empowered by increased transparency, and 
companies have been forced to align with popular demand for 
conflict-free mineral sourcing. Insofar as corporate accountability is 
concerned, corporations are exhibiting the substantive behaviors 
recommended by the SEC’s disclosure provisions. Disclosure 
provisions at least provide a viable option for regulating transnational 
corporate social responsibility. 
An interwoven issue, however, is whether those changed corporate 
behaviors address social policy concerns or only burden companies 
with excessive regulations. The problem is that federal legislatures are 
promulgating corporate laws that, even if implemented, will not solve 
the issues they propose to address. For example, despite the 
overwhelming conversion by American companies to conflict-free 
sourcing, atrocities continue to plague the D.R. Congo.118 Allowing 
regulatory laws aimed at corporate social responsibility to be revisited 
in less reactive times might allow for more thoughtful, meticulous, 
and effective planning. For example, through recent support from the 
United States and the Netherlands, a “conflict-free” tagging system 
being implemented by Congolese authorities is reviving the 
Congolese mineral trade in certain areas of the country.119 Although 
difficult to conceive, given the historical boom-bust pattern of 
corporate regulation, applying resources and regulation in less chaotic 
times could foster a dynamic, cost-effective, and comprehensive 
solution. With Section 1502’s sunset provisions available in five 
years, now would be an ideal time to begin formulating a legislative 
plan. The Congolese people, U.S. corporations, and humanitarian 
groups could all benefit from such an arrangement. 
 
118 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Dire Scene in Congolese City as Rebels Begin to Leave, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/world/africa/alarming           
-picture-as-rebels-prepare-to-leave-goma.html. 
119 Jonny Hogg, “Conflict-free” tags help revive Congo minerals trade, REUTERS 
(Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/08/us-congo-democratic-mining    
-idUSBRE8A70PG20121108). 
